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Throughout much of its history, Communist China has shown a distinct 
preference for bilateral diplomacy in a world largely defined by multilateral diplomacy. 
Why? Since its founding in 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been 
politically dominated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This thesis argues that the 
CCP, with Mao Zedong at the reigns, has been the driving force behind China’s rejection 
of multilateralism. It further argues that Mao Zedong ruled the party through his 
influential personality and dominated Chinese foreign policy because of it. China’s 
turbulent and painful history with the West and the acceptance of communist ideology 
were critical determinants in Mao’s rejection of Western diplomacy standards. This thesis 
concludes that, though multilateralism is indeed on the rise in China, it has been 
conditional and by no means Western. Furthermore, U.S. policy makers should hold the 
history of Chinese foreign policy in high regard when considering the formation of U.S. 
policy on China.   
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What exactly is this “China” that we are discussing here…Frankly, the 
more I have learned about China, the more elusive a clear definition 
becomes. 
—Odd Arne Westad1 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis studies Chinese alliance politics since the revolution of 1949. The 
major research question seeks to explain China’s pronounced preference for bilateral 
international agreements and relationships, during a period in which global politics has 
increasingly been shaped by multilateral institutions and alliances. It also considers, as a 
secondary question, whether China has been well served by its alliance policies, given the 
available alternatives. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
As Michael Hunt aptly states, “History is essential and central, not optional and 
incidental, to an understanding of Chinese foreign policy”; understanding the history of 
Chinese foreign relations can inform the modern-day policy maker or analyst on Chinese 
alliance politics.2 With the assent of China as a global super power it is imperative that 
American policy makers and strategists have a thorough understanding of Chinese 
foreign policy formation. Understanding the roots of Chinese foreign policy is essential 
to forming an accurate knowledge base, which may then aid in future Sino-American 
relations. This thesis analyzes historical cases of China’s proclivity for bilateral alliances 
and seeks to understand why those alliances came to be. The answer will help improve 
general knowledge and understanding of Chinese diplomacy today. 
                                                 
1 Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire: China and the World since 1750 (New York: Basic Books, 
2012), 3. 
2 Michael H. Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996), 3. 
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Examining this subject is a challenging task because the history of the Chinese 
Communist Party’s (CCP) foreign policy is a colorful assortment of traditions.3  And 
since the heritage of China’s past is important to the CCP, it therefore plays a part in 
China’s modern foreign policy; understanding this legacy can help to explain why China 
has tended to lean toward bilateral alliances and agreements when much of the world has 
not.4 This research has intrinsic value for today’s international system because of the rise 
of China as a truly Great Power. Within China, the purposeful utilization of historical 
memory has been an important tool for CCP education campaigns over the past thirty 
years.5 Because China’s own history is such an integral part of CCP politics, anyone who 
studies any aspect of CCP politics must also be well versed in China’s political history. 
This thesis shows that despite a recent willingness to engage in multilateral activity, 
Chinese political authorities are still influenced by their history and prefer to engage 
other nation-states bilaterally and use multilateral alliances only if they view them as 
advantageous to their interests. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology for this thesis is historical analysis. The goal of this 
thesis is to develop a narrative on Chinese bilateralism since the PRC’s inception in 1949 
to determine why China conducted the majority of its diplomacy and alliance structure in 
a bilateral fashion.6 By dividing Chinese foreign relations into distinctive elements by 
time period and seeking to find and explain causation for bilateralism in each period, a 
productive analysis is possible. Organizing aspects of CCP foreign policy and alliance 
politics is helpful in identifying the main causes of the PRC’s tendency toward bilateral 
relations. 
                                                 
3 Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 8. 
4 Ibid., 9. 
5 Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and 
Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 111. 




Because it is helpful to look at Chinese foreign relations through a historical 
window, this thesis adopts Peter Van Ness’s historical framing method with some minor 
revisions. In his work Revolution and Chinese Foreign  Policy, Van Ness helpfully 
arranges Chinese foreign policy into four general time periods: “1949–1952: communist 
internationalism; 1953–1957, peaceful coexistence; 1958–1965, militant anti-imperialism 
and the emergence of antirevisionism (sic); and 1966–[76], the Great Proletariat Cultural 
Revolution [GPCR].”7 Two additional time periods have been added to help organize the 
history of PRC foreign policy to aid analysis: pre-1949, the foundations of CCP foreign 
policy and 1977–1989, the end of the GPCR and the PRC’s efforts at modernization up 
through the end of the Cold War. This thesis ends its analysis at 1989, a significant year 
to consider. While the Cold War did not officially come to a conclusion until 1991, in 
1989 communist governments throughout Eastern Europe and Central Asia were 
successfully toppled in what is commonly referred to as the autumn of nations.8 The 
autumn of nations event served as the beginning of the end for the USSR and decisively 
reconfigured the global political structure. The bipolar days dominated by two 
superpowers was quickly approaching its end. Pro-democracy rallies began in Beijing 
during the spring of 1989 with demonstrators in Tiananmen Square reaching 1 million in 
number.9 The brutal crackdown employed by the CCP caused a significant shift in 
domestic and international politics that created the strange blend between communist 
ideology and capitalist economic principles that has served to placate the people of China 
with economic success and help the CCP grow Chinese nationalism.10  
  
                                                 
7 Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking’s Support for Wars of National 
Liberation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1970), 10. 
8 Richard D. Anderson Jr., “Why Did the Soviet Empire Collapse So Fast-and Why Was the Collapse 
a Surprise?” in Political Science as Puzzle Solving, ed. Bernard Grofman (Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press, 2001), 85. 
9 Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: Norton, 1990), 741. 
10 Westad, Restless Empire, 394. 
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II. PRE-1949: FOUNDATIONS OF CCP FOREIGN POLICY 
A. THE WANING YEARS OF THE QING DYNASTY 
To borrow and adapt from Sir Winston Churchill, China is “a riddle, wrapped in a 
mystery, inside an enigma.”11 China is more than a nation-state, and understanding the 
history behind the formation of the CCP is essential to understanding the CCP today. The 
PRC’s past is rooted in a civilization that extends back over four millennia. Coming to 
fully understand such a country and people is perhaps an impossible task. Keeping this in 
mind, we now come to consider the formative years of modern China and all of its 
tumult. The history of China in the late 19th and early 20th centuries is one defined by 
struggle and change, oftentimes violent. The years between the 1840s and 1949 have 
been referred to as the one hundred years of national humiliation because China’s foreign 
relations were characterized by Western domination and exploitation.12 A central 
characteristic of Chinese foreign policy during the mid-19th century was a cultural 
superiority complex that was adopted by a vast majority of Chinese people, particularly 
officials and gentry—for thousands of years the Chinese people held the notion that they 
were superior to all other peoples.13 Supporting this idea was a long tradition of 
neighboring people groups paying tribute to Imperial China as the superior nation. This 
abruptly changed in the 1840s when China’s relationship with Western powers, Russia 
included, became one defined by China’s weakness relative to the those powers besieging 
it. To a civilization that had long thought of itself as the most ascendant society on earth, 
this came as a shock and had lasting impacts.14 China, thereby, started a path to 
modernization that was neither straight, nor easy. China’s history is deep and complex, 
and like other nations, the PRC recognizes that its past can help it understand the 
                                                 
11 “Winston Churchill Quotes at BrainyQuote.com,” BrainyQuote, accessed June 15, 2015, 
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/w/winstonchu156896.html. 
12 Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, 3, 7–8, 65–9. 
13 Li Chien-nung, The Political History of China, 1840-1928, ed. Teng Ssu-Yu and Jeremy Ingalls 
(Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand, 1956), 164. 
14 Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, 71. 
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present.15 In determining why 20th century Chinese foreign policy preferred bilateral 
relations, one must begin with history.  
Before delving into the last years of the Qing dynasty, understanding two 
fundamental truths is essential in order to begin comprehending Chinese foreign policy 
during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.16 As Westad illustrates, during this very 
tumultuous and painful period—both internally and externally—China retained enough 
unity as a state to maintain a central government that carried with it the directive to 
conduct international diplomacy. This was important because even though China was 
relatively quite weak in relation to other international powers, as long as there was 
something of a government that represented all of China it was able to keep peripheral 
parts of China from being annexed. The fact that China’s borders today are roughly the 
same as the Qing’s is testament to this fact. The other important fact to note is China’s 
growth in capabilities across all levels of society. Despite being a largely agrarian 
society, China was able to begin a modernization of sorts using foreign technologies in its 
industrial, communications, transportation, banking, and financial sectors. While all of 
this was a small part of China’s overall economy, it nonetheless enabled it to provide an 
economy that was accessible to the more modern international community.17 By the eve 
of World War Two, Chinese modernity started to come to life, and that is an important 
point to consider in any analysis of subsequent Chinese foreign policy. 
B. POST-IMPERIAL REPUBLICANISM AND THE RISE OF COMMUNISM 
Out of this period of humiliation, Chinese foreign policy developed a dominant 
theme that provides a helpful starting point in considering PRC preference for bilateral 
diplomacy. This theme or pattern is “the conflicting impulses toward autonomy and 
dependency that have governed China’s external relations.”18 It is also worth noting that 
this strain between the lure of dependency and the desire for autonomy was consistently 
                                                 
15 Hunt, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 9. 
16 Westad, Restless Empire, 124. 
17 Ibid., 124–5. 
18 Hunt, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 9. 
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scattered throughout Chinese foreign policy.19 Ishwer Ojha notes that this period sparked 
a deep desire inside Chinese leaders to recapture the greatness that they thought was due 
to a country of its size, geographical position, population, and long and robust history.20 
Regardless, the waning years of the Qing dynasty created an unstable situation in China 
characterized by urban protest movements and anti-imperialist action; by the 1920s these 
movements saw Nationalists and Communists allied together in the hope of a populist 
patriotic uprising.21 For the CCP, the struggles of the 1920s, 30s, and 40s were 
particularly formative with regard to shaping foreign policy.22 Central to CCP foreign 
policy during this era was Mao Zedong. During the 1930s the CCP did not have a foreign 
policy stance, and it was Mao who laid down the basic fundamentals for the CCP foreign 
policy model.23 The strain between dependency and autonomy was evident in Mao’s 
denunciation of aid from the United Nations (UN) as a tool of imperialism and his 
development of the united front model of foreign policy designed to harness both the 
Soviets and the United States to aid the CCP in ridding China of foreign occupation.24 
The massive Soviet aid program that developed in the 1950s also points to this inherent 
discord within the CCP as it struggled to stand up and be truly independent, yet was still 
reliant of foreign aid to do so. At his core, however, Mao distrusted the Western system 
of alliances because he viewed them as a major tool of imperialism. Laced in his distrust 
of the Western system are the roots of Mao’s and the CCP’s preference for bilateralism.  
The years in Yan’an were formative for Mao and the CCP. After the Japanese 
invasion in 1937 the CCP used its headquarters in Yan’an and its temporary truce with 
Chiang Kai-Shek’s Guomindong government (GMD) to consolidate and further organize 
the party.25 Spence outlines that under Mao the CCP defined communism in China along 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 24. 
20 Ishwer C. Ojha, Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition: The Diplomacy of Cultural 
Despair (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 22. 
21 Hunt, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 23. 
22 Ibid., 23–5. 
23 Ibid., 125, 204. 
24 Ibid., 131–4. 
25 Spence, Modern China, 461. 
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three areas: the party, the government, and the army. These three entities were the 
defining organizational structure that aided in the development and growth of the CCP 
and eventually a communist China. While challenged for overall leadership, Mao was 
able to establish himself as the preeminent leader and implemented a successful 
recruiting program. Between 1937 and 1940 the CCP grew from approximately 40,000 
members to 800,000.26 The CCP instituted land reform in its controlled territory, a 
historical grievance among peasants, and were thus able to establish a strong base of 
support with the peasant population, which was the majority of China’s population.27 
Westad further discusses that Mao’s domestic united front policy was very popular with 
the people and provided the framework for the united front policy later used for foreign 
policy and relations. The war against the Japanese proved a perfect contrast for the CCP 
to present itself as the liberator of China and the only political group strong enough to 
save China. The CCP’s strength was in its revolutionary spirit and willpower, which 
proved itself in the years to come. As the CCP united, their only main competition, the 
GMD split apart internally and weakened. As World War Two came to a close the CCP 
was growing quickly and Mao had entrenched himself as the undisputed leader. Mao 
Zedong Thought, as it became known, and its way of thinking and philosophizing 
became central to CCP political life. With the advent of Mao Thought came a rampant 
bend toward abstruse and idealistic thinking inside the inner circle of the CCP which 
carried with it significant corollaries for the future PRC’s foreign affairs.28 
C. WORLD WAR TWO AND THE CHINESE CIVIL WAR 
Following the conclusion of World War Two, the political situation in China 
began to rapidly change. This change also had an influential effect on the development of 
Chinese bilateralism in foreign policy. Odd Arne Westad identifies that August 1945 was 
likely the most difficult moment in the political life of Mao Zedong.29 After experiencing 
massive growth during the war with the Japanese, Mao and the CCP expected to continue 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
27 Westad, Restless Empire, 272–7, 287–8. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 288–9. 
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their upward trend and directly challenge the GMD for control of China. Much to Mao’s 
chagrin, he found himself making concessions to the GMD and losing influence in China. 
Mao’s historic distrust of foreign powers led him to believe that the cause of all of his 
problems was the United States. The international situation, in his view, was being 
dominated by the United States and moving according to its dictates. The GMD was the 
recipient of all of the American aid and the CCP received nothing but Stalin’s cold 
shoulder. Instead of being treated as a legitimate contender for political rule in China, the 
CCP was relegated to non-contender. Additionally, Mao was distrustful of Stalin’s 
motivations in Asia.30 Michael Hunt sheds some light on why Stalin was proving to be 
difficult to predict and why his policies in China were prone to shifting.31 Unsure of what 
would happen in China Stalin made attempts to balance his position in China and did not 
lend the CCP outright support. Additionally, the CCP lacked any type of legitimate 
international recognition, and, consequently, the CCP was denied open aid by Stalin as he 
continued to support a general peace in China and strengthen his position vis a vis the 
Americans. From the CCP position it seemed that Stalin was doing little to nothing to aid 
their cause and by doing so was actually giving aid to the GMD. Eventually Stalin 
ordered a withdrawal of troops from northern China while concurrently supplying the 
CCP on the way out. This did much to restore the Soviets as a possible ally in the eyes of 
the Chinese Communists. By the middle of 1946, civil war resumed as the two major 
political factions struggled for control of China.32 
Westad states that the Chinese Civil War defined PRC foreign policy for the next 
ten years.33 Shunted from the immediate post-war negotiations and denied aid from the 
two emerging superpowers, the United States and the USSR, the CCP became frustrated 
in its attempts at restructuring China.34 Both Westad and Hunt note that with little initial 
support from its only communist allies and the GMD receiving support from the 
                                                 
30 Ibid. 
31 Hunt, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 168–9. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Westad, Restless Empire, 290. 
34 Hunt, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 171. 
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Americans, the CCP was only able to secure control of China by militarily defeating the 
GMD in 1949.35 What the war against the GMD did do was fortify the CCP’s alliance 
with Soviet Russia to such an extent that it became the lone supplier of aid and support 
for the fledgling PRC and also provided the blueprint for how to build a successful 
communist nation-state.36 As the Civil War progressed, the Chinese Communists became 
heavily reliant on Soviet aid, a precursor of the reconstruction efforts after the CCP’s 
victory.37 After the Civil War, the CCP relied heavily on Soviet experience and expertise 
to bring order to a China that was in almost total disorder.38 It also cemented China in an 
adversarial relationship with the United States that lasted for the next twenty plus years. 
China embarked on a bold nation building program that ultimately succumbed to Mao 
Zedong’s ideological zeal and resulted in China’s near economic collapse. 
 
                                                 
35 Westad, Restless Empire, 290; Hunt, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 161–2. 
36 Westad, Restless Empire, 290. 
37 Ibid., 304–5. 
38 Ibid., 290, 304–5. 
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III. 1949–1952: COMMUNIST NATIONALISM 
Shortly after its inception, the PRC encountered immediate challenges in the form 
of U.S. involvement in the Korean War and the Taiwan Straits crisis; developmentally, 
these were critical years and set the path that China was to follow for many years 
thereafter. Additionally, the PRC made a bold unilateral statement in the international 
arena by invading Tibet in 1950. During these early years, Mao Zedong was the crucial 
figure who lead the PRC and it was his vision that dominated and guided China.39 Hunt 
keenly illustrates that as the guiding beacon for CCP diplomacy Mao, ironically, had little 
experience with the outside world and was inexperienced in diplomacy; Spence describes 
his first experience within the Soviet Union, for example, as “baffling and 
contradictory.”40 Additionally, newly established as the ruling party in China, the CCP 
did not receive much international recognition.41 It was in these early stages of CCP rule 
that the leaning to one side, toward Soviet allegiance, developed; the CCP focused on 
securing its borders, unifying the country, and strengthening its relationship with the 
Soviets.42 However, icy relations with the United States proved a hindrance to 
developing the difficult relationship with the CCP’s fellow communists, the Soviets.43  
In 1949 Mao began his lifelong focus of renewing China and throwing off the 
chains of its imperialist past. Fundamental to accomplishing his goal was revolution and 
isolation.44 Westad recounts how party leaders yearned to cut all ties with the Western 
world and develop China as the model Communist state. In order to do this, Mao and 
other party leaders felt that it must sever all ties with the West—after a century of 
unequal treaties the CCP wanted China to stand on its own, albeit with the party as the 
only power. Power was the key to party leaders and it needed to be legitimate. If the West 
                                                 
39 Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a 
New Global Order, Second edition (New York: Penguin Books, 2012), 110. 
40 Hunt, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 208; Spence, Modern China, 524. 
41 Hunt, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 176. 
42 Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy, 11. 
43 Hunt, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 181. 
44 Westad, Restless Empire, 297–301. 
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was allowed to meddle in China’s affairs, the CCP’s legitimacy could, and likely would 
in their minds, be challenged thereby preventing the glorious rejuvenation of China. Mao 
and his fellow party leaders, therefore, set out to systematically destroy China’s ties with 
the rest of the world. Only the Soviet Union and the communists in North Korea were 
treated as allies during these early years.45  
A. FINDING THEIR WAY 
Two common trends in Chinese alliance politics during these years were its 
relative isolation from the majority of the international community and its willingness to 
use force to accomplish its objectives. The use of force was one of Mao’s favorite tools 
used to direct the PRC. Consolidating power, legitimizing his and the party’s rule, and re-
building China were perhaps the most important items on Mao’s agenda shortly after 
declaring the establishment of the PRC in 1949. The preceding years of colonial rule had 
a profound impact upon Mao and other senior communist officials and they were deeply 
insulted by Chinese subjugation at the hands of the Japanese and the Western powers; the 
colonial rule left a searing wound in the consciousness of CCP members and it directly 
influenced their policy formation.46 The memories of foreign domination and meddling 
in Chinese affairs provided a reason for the PRC to move away from the international 
community and toward the Soviet Union. In fact, the party feared and hated Western 
influence on its policies so much that it purged the country of its external links believing 
the party’s rule would never be safe if outside influences, except Soviet, were allowed 
in.47 This concept of liberation from foreign rule became a central tenet of the CCP’s 
foreign affairs and it continues into the present day.48  
To further understand CCP decision making during these formative years, 
Michael Hunt outlines four noteworthy aspects on CCP thinking prior to and shortly after 
                                                 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 318; Jacques, When China Rules the World, 109. 
47 Westad, Restless Empire, 297–8. 
48 Ibid., 297. 
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1949.49 Each is worthy of remembrance when considering ensuing years of CCP foreign 
policy. First, the CCP generally adhered to a policy of discussion and harmony in 
decision making at the top level. The methodology of group discussion and decision was 
evident up to the Korean War and was encouraged by Mao himself until his cult 
personality took over the party decision making process in later years; Fairbank also 
notes this group discussion process within the CCP.50 Second, decisions made by the 
party were not easily changed or set aside. The cautious and careful planning by senior 
CCP leadership had an inherent sticking power and not until later years was Mao able to 
alter course upon a whim. During the pre-1949 years it was difficult for the CCP to meet 
together; therefore when a decision was settled upon it often took very evident 
weaknesses in the policy to force CCP leadership to change it. Hunt draws a good 
example of this with the rise and fall of a doctrine know as new democracy. Ideological 
in nature, new democracy was meant to provide the stepping stone upon which China 
could enter into socialism. Meant to last ten to fifteen years, it was laid threadbare by 
uncertain economic conditions and difficulties with Soviet and U.S. relations. Mao 
abandoned the new democracy in favor of a prompt shift to socialism. Third, the CCP 
institutional structure which girded decision making was unstable. This created a system 
that was highly consolidated and stressed individual personality as central to the process. 
Perhaps this is one of the reasons Mao’s own cult personality eventually came to 
dominate CCP politics. This also meant that once a decision had been made, it could be 
implemented by an assortment of individuals in ad hoc groups which varied widely 
depending on what foreign affairs bureau was given the tasking. Fourth, underlying the 
modernization attempts of the CCP after 1949 was the complex intertwining of domestic 
and international policies—domestic policy did not end at the water’s edge.51 The CCPs 
external relations were fundamentally shaped by its domestically derived ideological 
agenda for China’s modernization. The long term concerns of the PRC’s social, political, 
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and economic transformation were critical in defining how China related with the outside 
world. This trend persevered in the PRC and in CCP politics. 
B. KOREAN WAR 
The outbreak of the Korean War put the newly formed PRC to the test. The 
Korean War is an important case study with regard to Chinese foreign policy because it 
played an integral part in setting its course for the next thirty years and it also helped 
cement the PRC’s adversarial relationship with the West. Additionally, new tensions 
soon arose in class relations as a result of the war, and CCP leadership feared that 
American-Nationalist forces would spill over into China and join dissident groups against 
the Party.52 The fear this caused within CCP leadership produced the counter-
revolutionary campaign of 1950–51.53 The counter-revolutionary campaign was one of 
the first major cases that displayed the interplay of domestic and international issues 
within CCP foreign policy creation. A self-conscious CCP saw its domestic and 
international goals as intertwined and under threat from international rivalries which in 
turn created internal political and military pressure.54 These domestic and international 
tensions came to play an important role in forming Mao’s vision of how to develop China 
and in how China was to interact with the international community. During the early 
1950s supporting revolutions and wars of national liberation became an important 
implement of PRC foreign policy, and this support was designed to export the Chinese 
revolutionary experience to the world in order to display Chinese leadership and also to 
help nurture the budding revolutionary spirit throughout the world.55 The PRC’s 
intervention in the Korean War was one of its first actions in supporting this ethos.  
During the months leading up to the Korean War there was very little support 
within the PRC for engaging the UN forces, and Mao himself was reluctant to get 
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involved.56 However, Mao gave his support for Kim Il-sung’s invasion of South Korea in 
the spring of 1950.57 While the PRC had cordial relations with the North Korean 
communists, they were not close and Mao felt little loyalty to Kim’s regime; in actuality, 
the initial support for an invasion of the South by Northern communists actually came 
from Stalin, perhaps as way to test the newly formed CCP and also to control the 
communist movement in Asia.58 Thomas Christensen points out that while it is still not 
known for certain, it is likely that the Soviet leader gave his ascent only on the condition 
that Mao give his, thereby putting the onus of support for Kim’s plans on Mao.59 
Christensen also points out that unification with Taiwan was an important goal for Mao, 
perhaps this also placed Mao in a precarious situation because he was still trying to unify 
the PRC by seizing Taiwan and any support for an invasion of Korea would delay that 
plan.60 Whatever the causes, the hands off posturing by the United States likely entered 
into the calculus of all of the communist leaders thinking; both President Harry Truman 
and Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated that the United States would not involve 
itself in any Chinese civil strife and that the United States would not defend the Korean 
peninsula.61 Considering relatively little American encroachment in East Asia in late 
1949 and early 1950 it perhaps seemed an astute decision to support Kim’s invasion of 
the South. 
Whatever the calculus to support Kim, Mao did not expect the United States to 
send large amounts of troops to Korea nor position naval assets in the straights of 
Taiwan.62 Once the American-led UN forces gained control of Pyong-yang, the capital of 
Kim’s Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the decision made by the CCP to 
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intervene was not a foregone conclusion.63 Cautious and recognizing that fighting against 
the United States was extremely perilous, Mao and his top general, Peng Dehuai, argued 
for PRC intervention based upon the premise that fighting the Americans early was 
preferably to waiting until the United States built up even more forces in Korea and 
Taiwan.64 Furthermore, Christensen illustrates that Mao and Peng argued that the 
aggressive actions by the Americans in placing naval assets in the Taiwan Straits 
confirmed its imperialist intentions toward the PRC and its intent to encircle and contain 
China using Korea and Taiwan as staging areas. This was a legitimate concern. Mao and 
his general also believed that the United States could use Korea and Taiwan as staging 
areas to invade or influence mainland China. By aiding Taiwan the United States was 
lending support to Mao’s domestic rivals, which could be emboldened at a time when a 
large majority of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops were fighting in Korea. A 
United States-occupied Korea, however, was a greater immediate danger to Mao and his 
colleagues; if the Americans held the Korean peninsula, their presence could create long 
term security problems for the PRC. Mao and the CCP calculatedly challenged a much 
stronger adversary because of the fear that the threat would only grow over time if action 
was not taken immediately.65 Fighting early instead of later also showed international 
communist unanimity in the face of Western imperialism, a willingness to fight its foes, 
and perhaps most importantly it solidified their alliance with the Soviets and shattered the 
possibility of joining the larger world that many Chinese had hoped for after the 
revolution.66  
The CCP’s emphasis on unity for legitimacy loomed large in its domestic and 
international agenda and was a driving factor for China’s international isolation and 
preference for bilateral relations through much of its existence.   
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C. TIBET AND TAIWAN 
Both Tibet and Taiwan were important pieces in the CCP’s plan to achieve full 
unification after 1949.67 Spence further points out that after Chiang Kai-Shek and his 
GMD government retreated to Taiwan, the military concentrated on territorial 
reunification. In October 1950, the same month PRC troops were committed to Korea, 
China invaded Tibet. Contrasted with Taiwan and Korea Tibet was, accurately, predicted 
not to provide the PLA with much of a challenge. With no intervention on behalf of Tibet 
from the United Nations, India, or Great Britain, China was able to fully consolidate 
Tibet one year after the invasion. Framed as liberation from the imperialist West, the 
conquering of Tibet marked the beginning of the CCP’s quest to control what it thought 
was rightfully China’s. Taiwan, however, proved to be more problematic.68  
As a main part of the CCP’s efforts of achieving territorial consolidation through 
reunification, Taiwan played, and continues to play, an important role in CCP politics.69 
Mao and his fellow cadre saw Taiwan as part of China, and as long as their enemies were 
allowed to control Taiwan, CCP control of mainland China could be challenged.70 As 
Zheng Wang has pointed out, modern day CCP politics continues to insist Taiwan is the 
rightful territory of the PRC.71 Taiwan’s independence assaults the ancient Chinese 
concept of unity and the heart of the PRC’s apparent legitimacy, and as a result Taiwan 
has been made an integral part of the CCP’s more recent rejuvenation plans.72 The initial 
challenge posed by the GMD’s escape to Taiwan lay in the sheer difficulty in taking the 
island. Chiang Kai-shek and his band of nationalists had fled to the island after their 
defeat in 1949, and once safely on Taiwan they began to fortify it and put perhaps the 
best natural defense between them and mainland China, the sea. Invading Taiwan could 
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not be done without adequate sea transportation, and the PLA possessed weak 
amphibious forces that would have difficulty conducting such an operation.73  
The United States’ stance on Taiwan also presented difficulties. Making matters 
worse, President Truman sent the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait after the United 
States entered the Korean War.74 From Mao’s viewpoint the Americans were looking 
stronger and more aggressive as a result. Furthermore, the Americans reversed their 
position that they would not meddle in the Chinese Civil War, which was not yet 
complete in Mao’s view. The actions of the United States also gave further credence to 
Mao’s view that the Americans were trying to encircle the PRC by forming alliances 
from French-Indo China to Korea and that any hope the PRC had of continuing to stand 
on its own lay in fighting the United States and isolating itself from the imperialist 
West.75 By placing its fleet in the Taiwan Strait and entering the Korean War the United 
States probably stopped any invasion of Taiwan from occurring.76 However, in so doing 
the United States reinforced China’s perception of the ills of Western imperialism, 
solidified the American’s position as China’s principal enemy, and gave the CCP fodder 
to support its claim that the United States hated China and the Chinese people.77 This 
also contributed to Mao’s design to isolate China from the international community, 
which was a critical piece in the development of his domestic programs. As China drifted 
further and further away from Western influence, it embraced the Soviet model and 
welcomed immense amounts of Soviet aid.  
D. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS 
Sino-Soviet relations were at their strongest during the 1950s. With the signing 
and declaration of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance on February 
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14, 1950 the two communist powers started what appeared to be a close relationship.78 
Michael Hunt indicates that as hostilities increased with the United States, CCP reliance 
upon the Soviets grew.79 Not only did the newly formed PRC require Soviet support, the 
Soviets also became the CCP’s model of a communist state.80 While there was some 
division among Mao and other senior CCP leaders there was agreement that they needed 
Soviet aid and instruction in state building—Mao’s chief concern was how to incorporate 
Soviet assistance while ensuring he kept control of China.81 As Westad points out, 
notwithstanding the discordant views among key CCP leadership on the topic of Soviet 
aid, there was sincere approbation for the Soviet model of what a communist state should 
look like. The Chinese communists desired science, technology, military strength, and 
political organization. Central to what party leaders found attractive was a strong and 
modern Soviet Union that was also anti-imperialist, and therefore not hostile to China. 
One cannot underestimate the massive amount of Soviet influence on the PRC in the 
1950s. Every sector of the new PRC was modeled after the Soviet bloc, including its 
foreign policy. While some western observers thought that China was at a crossroads in 
terms of its foreign policy, the reality was much different. The link with the Soviet Union 
was intended to be the largest transfer of foreign knowledge into China in history; in the 
minds of Mao and other party leaders, in order to break with its troubled past the CCP 
needed to push itself away from the imperialist West and form a strong alliance with its 
communist neighbors to the north. The American hostility in Korea and Taiwan further 
cemented the idea that the West was against China. Westad further outlines that together, 
the PRC and the Soviet Union were to create the greatest anti-western alliance since the 
Ottoman Empire.82  
Why did the leaders of the CCP so closely associate China with the Soviet Union 
despite deep misgivings (rightly so) about foreign meddling in Chinese affairs? Westad 
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explains that the Soviet system was the core of Chinese communism and Spence also 
describes the depth of the Soviet partnership within China during this period.83 While 
Mao and other leaders maintained a cautious outlook toward their northern Soviet 
neighbors, they nonetheless knew that the CCP was in dire need of assistance in re-
building China into a communist superpower and the Soviet system provided the basis 
upon which that could be accomplished.84 While the process became more Sinicized as 
time progressed, the first decade of the PRC’s existence was marked by a heavy reliance 
on Soviet aid and expertise. Westad again states that another reason why the Soviet 
experience was so deeply entrenched in China was the nature of the interaction. The 
Sino-Soviet encounter was extremely broad and deep. While the Soviet aid program to 
China grew to be history’s largest foreign assistance program, it also became the model 
in which millions of Chinese with little exposure to the outside world came to understand 
modernity through Soviet education, policies, and specialists.85  
Though the relationship with Soviet Russia did not last long and became 
characterized by discord, the fledgling PRC needed Soviet assistance. During this period, 
the PRC came as close to a multilateral alliance as it ever did prior to the 1990s. Wary of 
both superpowers, the relationship with the USSR grew more conflicted. Key to 
understanding the Sino-Soviet relationship during this time period, which later became 
more important, is understanding that to the Soviets their support was only attractive if 
the PRC remained the subordinate ally and malleable to Soviet intentions.86 This proved 
the key determinate in the decline of the Sino-Soviet relationship in the 1950s and also 
helped drive China into a deeper isolation. 
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IV. 1953–1957: PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE  
Mao’s full program of isolation was yet to occur, and during this period of 
Chinese international relations the PRC sought to establish itself in the international arena 
through promotion of peaceful relations between communist and non-communist 
countries without entangling itself in alliances.87 The phrase Spirit of Bandung generally 
characterizes Chinese diplomacy during this period because of the peace conference in 
Bandung attended by Zhou Enlai in 1955.88 The Bandung Conference helped legitimize 
the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and they were adopted by the PRC; the Five 
Principles specifically called for opposition to hegemony and multilateralism.89 While 
Yongjin Zhang argues that China did not seek isolation during this era, it was interested 
in challenging the international status quo dominated by the two superpowers.90 In order 
to do this, China promoted a new conciliatory self-image and placed an emphasis on 
winning Asian neighbors away from Western alliances through offers of good will, vice 
direct confrontation and revolutionary support.91 However, this version of Chinese 
foreign policy did not last long after the Bandung conference as Chinese policy became 
more anti-imperialist and militant.92 As in other periods of China’s foreign policy the 
PRC did not establish any multilateral alliances nor did it attempt to do so during this 
period. With the establishment of the Five Principles, China set itself up to avoid the 
entanglements of foreign alliances for the foreseeable future. Not fully isolationists at this 
point, China’s opposition to hegemony and a desire to challenge the established order put 
it at odds with the Soviets and Americans in the coming years. 
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China’s relationship with the Soviet Union deepened during the mid-1950s, 
largely due to the efforts of Nikita Khrushchev.93 When Joseph Stalin died in 1953, 
writes Westad, his ideological distrust of the CCP also died with him. As the new Soviet 
Premier, Khrushchev identified China as an important ally because it was a large and 
populous country with massive amounts of potential, it shared a common border with 
Russia, and it was home to a robust communist party that sought to imitate the Soviet 
model. To Khrushchev, China was a great opportunity that the Soviets must take hold of. 
The Chinese desire to model themselves after the Soviets was perceived as an honor to 
the Soviets, and it also brought with it the opportunity to shape the future of communist 
China. Khrushchev offered more civilian and military assistance than Stalin ever 
imagined giving, and by the mid-1950s every ministry, government organ, and major 
industrial initiative in China had a Soviet adviser embedded in it. Soviet advisers were 
truly involved in every aspect of Chinese society and life. Without the Soviet aid, the 
vision of a modern communist China that Mao and the CCP wanted would never have 
been realized. Most importantly for Mao, the Soviet aid also provided him the means to 
further isolate China and deepen the entrenchment between the West that the Korean War 
had created.94 
A. THE SPIRIT OF BANDUNG 
In 1955, Zhou Enlai, China’s premier, attended the Bandung Conference of Afro-
Asian Nations in Indonesia.95 The conference in Bandung provided CCP leadership with 
the opportunity to present a new peacemaking image of China that was eventually coined 
the spirit of Bandung.96 Zhou went to great lengths to present this image of China and 
also applied the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.97 With China in possession of a 
firm alliance with the Soviets and the accomplished task of having driven back the 
imperialists in Korea, Armstrong states that Mao and his fellow CCP cadre were intent on 
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developing China into a recognized international force. The Bandung efforts were 
intended to achieve international diplomatic recognition so that China could go about the 
business of influencing international politics, particularly in the Third World.98 Zhou 
Enlai’s use of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence was arguably foundational to 
CCP foreign policy for the next thirty years, as Keith’s article illustrates, and the specific 
rejection of hegemony and alliance politics in the Five Principles is of particular 
importance to understand.99 Originally outlined in 1953, Zhou described the Five 
Principles as ensuring a shared respect for each state’s territory and internal authority, a 
non-belligerent stance between states, non-intervention in other states internal affairs, and 
a recognized equality that underwrote peaceful relations between states.100 Directly 
opposing Zhou’s Five Principles was the imperialistic hegemony that China sought to 
avoid, and any efforts to form trilateral or multilateral alliances were viewed as aversive 
to the communist mission in China and greater Asia.101 
Despite the PRC’s general push toward peaceful coexistence in its foreign 
relations, real tensions continued to exist between China, the United States, and Taiwan. 
In September 1954, the PLA shelled the GMD held offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu, 
between mainland China and Taiwan.102 Christensen notes that while largely diplomatic 
in nature, these attacks were in large part conducted to respond to perceived negative 
trends in the international system and partially to satisfy domestic needs for Mao. In 
1954, Mao believed that two trends in the international system were moving to block the 
PRC’s acquisition of Taiwan and full Chinese unification. According to Christensen, the 
first was the diplomatic trend of international treaties relating to Asian civil wars that 
were favorable for the West. In the case of Korea and Vietnam, areas of importance to the 
CCP, two separate governments were set up to accommodate a communist north and 
capitalist south. In Mao’s view, if this were allowed to become a standard, it could stop 
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the CCP from unifying the country under the banner of the PRC and achieving 
international recognition as the legitimate government of a united China. The second was 
the increasing American system of anti-communist alliances in the region, personified in 
the creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).103 Spence also 
indicates in his work that the goal of SEATO was to arrest further communist 
advancements in Southeast Asia.104 This alliance was seen as purposefully blocking the 
PRC from achieving its goals, and if it was to include Taiwan it would only strengthen 
the Republic of China (ROC) politically and militarily and entrench the United States 
into the Chinese Civil War indefinitely.105   
The PRC’s main message it was trying to convey by shelling Quemoy and Matsu 
was that it would not stand by while America and Taiwan formed closer ties against 
China.106 The shelling also had domestic intentions. A committed revolutionary, Mao felt 
that the population needed reminding of the inimical international situation. The Korean 
War, the mollification of China’s western territories, and the Taiwan issue were seen by 
Mao as tools to generate revolutionary struggle in the populous that he felt was needed in 
order to implement his domestic plans.107 Always a wily opportunist, Mao continued to 
use international spats as fuel for his domestic revolutionary needs. This became a 
dominate theme throughout his leadership of China and intensified in the 1960s.  
B. NON-ALIGNMENT AND CHINA’S REVOLUTIONARY GOALS 
The CCP’s view of the international world was formed by a negative mixture of a 
Soviet influence that decried the United States and capitalism, the memory of China’s 
national humiliation at the hands of Europeans and Japanese, and the Korean and the 
Indochina wars.108 In the midst of this negative cocktail the Chinese Communists saw 
themselves as leaders in the international battle against imperialism and capitalism and in 
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aiding Third World countries to liberate themselves from the effects of colonialism.109 
Aiding fellow Third World countries through supporting wars of national liberation in 
order to gain supporters for China’s strategy to promote radical change in the 
international system was a large part of China’s foreign policy throughout the 1950s and 
1960s.110 Despite seeking to support multiple Third World nations in efforts of liberation 
and revolution, the CCP limited its obligations for support because Mao believed that 
revolutions must be self-sustaining and he thought it best to stay relatively free from the 
entanglement of alliances, the Soviet Union being the only exception.111  
The CCP’s negative view of the international political environment was also 
reinforced by Mao’s dominance of the party. Mao’s influence ran strong and it reigned 
over the party’s foreign affairs; as the 1950s and 1960s rolled on he continued to 
dominate party thought and foreign policy, evidenced by the fact that he remained firmly 
in control despite his disastrous Great Leap Forward (GLF) which killed an estimated 20 
to 30 million Chinese people.112 Mao himself was very suspicious of the international 
community, multilateral alliances, and any international norm that was perceived to stand 
in the way of China’s growth.113 From Mao’s perspective, the international norms in 
existence had to be abandoned if China was to achieve its potential. Conveniently at hand 
were the Five Principles. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were a defining 
doctrine of foreign policy for China.114 They underwrote the PRC’s opposition to 
hegemony and also its opposition to trilateral and multilateral alliances.115 Mao used this 
and a hostile American policy toward China to isolate China from ill of Western thought. 
Afraid of foreign influences, excepting Soviet, within China, Mao and others used the 
United States’ economic embargoes, diplomatic isolation, and American support for the 
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GMD as reasons why the PRC should seek isolation and struggle against the Western 
powers.116 As an example, in 1955 Mao calculatingly denied British Prime Minister 
Anthony Eden’s request to visit China to improve Sino-British relations.117 Mao needed 
the hostile international environment to set the stage for his upcoming social revolutions 
in which the people had to be convinced of the need for a self-sacrifice and revolutionary 
zeal similar to that of the 1930s; any alliance system could and likely would have 
jeopardized Mao’s domestic social objectives.118 The late 1950s also saw an increase in 
Mao’s pursuit to be more independent from the Soviets, which eventually exacerbated 
into a full split. Mao’s program of isolation was designed to strengthen China 
independent of the West and the Soviet Union. It is this theses position that Mao firmly 
believed that if the people maintained a revolutionary zeal he could harness that zeal and 
his plans would bring prosperity and true independence to the PRC. 
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V. 1958–1965: MILITANT ANTI-IMPERIALISM AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF ANTI-REVISIONISM 
The Sino-Soviet rift became more pronounced between 1958 and 1965, and 
Chinese foreign policy became increasingly more independent of the superpowers, 
particularly the USSR.119 While Soviet Russia viewed itself as the leader of international 
communism, China was determined not to continue as the junior partner.120 One of the 
main disagreements between the Soviets and the Chinese was how to deal with the 
imperialist West—put simply the Chinese were not willing to submit to the Soviet view 
of how to relate with the Americans.121 Frustrated and losing confidence with the 
Bandung style of foreign policy, China sought to venture further out on its own, establish 
a more revolutionary stance in the international order and develop new domestic 
policies.122 After 1958, China’s crumbling alliance with the Soviets accelerated; the two 
countries were increasingly at odds with each other, and China’s public challenges of 
Soviet policies increased.123 From the PRC’s perspective its main communist ally that it 
had historically looked to for support seemed to be either actively working against them, 
or just unwilling to help.124 Additionally, China continued to perceive the United States 
as a threat as China’s dispute with the Soviets deepened.125 Both of these factors were 
useful tools in Mao’s drive for isolation. The scenario of China being at odds with both 
superpowers naturally isolated the country from the international community writ large. 
This is one of the main reasons, during this period, that China was never inclined toward 
forming multilateral alliances. Another aspect to consider in this period was Mao’s plan 
to implement revolutionary domestic policy. In 1957 Mao launched the Anti-Rightist 
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campaign; lasting from 1957 to 1958 it was an assault against the skilled and intellectual 
upper classes in China.126 Designed to root out possible threats to the CCP it was just the 
beginning of a long period of internal struggle that hamstrung China’s propensity to be a 
global power through 1976 and the GPCR.127 It seems that the Sinicized version of 
communist ideology which called for distancing itself from international norms was a 
primary factor in restricting China from any form of multilateralism. 
A. MILITANT ANTI-IMPERIALISM: THE 1958 TAIWAN STRAIGHTS 
CRISIS AND THE 1962 WAR WITH INDIA 
For the PRC, 1958 was not a good year. The second Taiwan Straits Crisis ushered 
in more militant provocation from China, began the PRC’s further international isolation, 
and saw the beginning of one of history’s great social and economic catastrophes, the 
GLF. Why did Mao again launch a limited military campaign against Taiwan and its 
superpower ally, the United States? The answer appears to lie primarily with Mao’s 
domestic desires to transform China. During the late 1950s, CCP leaders perceived a shift 
in the balance of power structure between Beijing and Moscow; the Soviets were seen by 
the CCP as becoming increasingly powerful and as a result acting more assertively 
toward China.128 Mao saw the Soviets as gaining an upper hand politically and desired 
the PRC to become more independent of the alliance with the Soviets.129 As Mao’s 
ideology started growing more distant from the Soviet’s, his relationship with 
Khrushchev also started to worsen.130 In Mao’s view, his ideological vision for China 
precluded maintaining the alliance with the Soviets in its original form.131 Mao desired a 
self-sufficient China, and he needed to start preparing the populace for his long term 
plans, so he used foreign affairs to provide the support needed to organize Chinese 
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society for his GLF.132 He principally accomplished this by engineering a crisis tied to a 
possible war with the United States and the liberation of Taiwan.133 The attacks on 
Quemoy and Matsu were largely political and were never designed to actually conquer 
Taiwan or enter into war with the United States.134 In addition to preparing the Chinese 
public for his radical GLF, Mao also sought to further isolate China away from foreign 
entanglements and show independence.135 The attacks on the two islands were conducted 
without informing the Soviets in advance, thus displaying Mao’s ability and willingness 
to conduct foreign policy without Soviet input.136 The gap continued to widen between 
the two communist nations and China’s isolation continued to deepen. 
The Sino-Indian war in 1962 did much to damage China’s peaceful reputation 
inside the Third World and also helped further isolate China. For the majority of the 
1950s China was focused on developing good relations with its Asian neighbors, and it 
was largely successful in doing so. The 1955 conference in Bandung saw India and China 
declare perpetual peace with each other, and China appeared to have sanguine relations 
with the largest of their Asian neighbors.137 However, as the 1960s began the Sino-Indian 
relationship was near the breaking point. Westad also indicates that as CCP ideology 
under Mao drifted further left, CCP leadership became more critical of their Indian 
neighbors. Instead of viewing the Indian government as Third World allies, the CCP saw 
Indian leaders as conformist replacements to the British imperial system.138 Additionally, 
Mao and other leaders in the CCP were becoming more wary about their western 
borders.139 When extreme CCP policies led to rebellion in 1959 and the fleeing of the 
Dalai Lama, Mao decided that New Delhi was behind the insurrection.140 With Mao’s 
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belief that the Indians had designs to undermine party authority in Tibet and Soviet 
relations also soured there emerged a perceived threat that loomed outside China’s 
western borders that had to be confronted.  
The decision for war with India changed the political landscape of Asia and 
created a Sino-Indian tension that exists today. Garver correctly illustrated that the Sino-
Indian war of 1962 was largely a war of misperceptions and false projections.141 Garver 
further outlines how China incorrectly assessed India’s intentions in the Tibetan plateau 
region, projected blame onto India, and made errors in diplomacy that ultimately led to 
conflict. While official Indian knowledge of CIA-led subterfuge in the region was in fact 
real, China projected the blame for the 1959 rebellion and the general unrest in the area 
squarely on the shoulders of India. Among Chinese scholars there is unanimous 
agreement that the causes for the 1962 war with India lay directly with India and its 
attempts to undermine Chinese authority and seize Tibet. This is interesting. 
Additionally, the thinking of contemporary Chinese scholars reflects the thinking of the 
1962 leaders who chose war. Regardless, the 1962 CCP leaders deeply misunderstood 
India’s motives with respect to Tibet. Nehru’s India sought not to seize control of Tibet 
but rather sought to set up an arrangement between India and China that allowed for 
Tibet’s right for self-government while still under overall Chinese authority. Instead of 
mimicking the West’s absurdity and usage of nuclear bi-polarity, Nehru believed India 
and China could compromise and use Tibetan autonomy under Chinese sovereignty to 
bolster their relationship and create a new paradigm in international politics. Nehru’s 
actual actions and public records contradict the Chinese claim he was leading India to 
seize control of Tibet. While it seems Nehru and others were aware of covert CIA 
operations in Tibet designed to foment unrest, their intentions were rather clear that they 
had no designs on Tibet.142 So why did Mao and the CCP choose war and what did it do 
to their reputation in Asia? 
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While the policy development on both sides leading up to the 1962 war is 
complex and circuitous, it is clear both sides made diplomatic errors and misjudged each 
other and war was the course that resulted. China was able to soundly route the Indian 
forces and reinstate the status quo border between the two countries and strengthen its 
control over Tibet.143 However, the Sino-Indian relationship was seriously damaged as a 
result of China’s sweeping victory and it had a destabilizing effect in the region.144 As 
Garver states, China was now one of India’s chief antagonists second only to Pakistan, 
and the tense relationship has continued into the 21st century. Instead of seeing China as 
a possible ally, China was now viewed with fear and suspicion. India was much less 
willing to accept any Chinese diplomatic olive branches and become much more steadfast 
in keeping China out of Nepal and Bangladesh. India also began a military modernization 
campaign which continues to this day. The 1962 war also had the secondary effect of 
further isolating China in Asia. India’s strategic relationship with the Soviets deepened, 
which further isolated and encircled China.145 Moreover, China’s efforts at influencing 
other Third World countries against the Soviets were upset as a result of the conflict.146 
Perhaps if China had chosen a less aggressive tack the Sino-Indian relationship and 
China’s negative image in Asia would be much different today.147 What the 1962 war 
with India did provide the CCP with was fresh fodder for their domestic endeavors. With 
their relationship with the Soviets in tatters, and the GLF proving a disaster, the CCP 
needed something to help keep their control over the country solid and make Mao’s 
continued efforts for social campaigns possible. The war also served Mao’s desire to 
isolate China, as previously discussed, on the periphery and continue his domestic 
programs without foreign intervention. 
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B. THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD AND THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT 
Lasting from 1958 to 1961, the GLF was Mao’s plan to rapidly develop China. 
An utter failure, this social and economic experiment cost the lives of an estimated 45 
million Chinese peasants due to starvation also proved a springboard for Mao to 
deconstruct the PRC’s alliance with the Soviets.148 One of history’s greatest human 
disasters, the GLF was one of Mao’s efforts at moving away from the Soviet model and 
setting China on a new course, and, though a domestic policy, it was nonetheless 
interwoven into the PRC’s foreign affairs.149 Observing the GLF from its beginning, 
Soviet advisors were very much concerned with Mao’s grand plan for further 
modernization in China. One of China’s main problems in 1958 was that urbanization 
was happening faster than industrialization; urban unemployment rose which created 
underemployment in the countryside where most of China’s population resided.150 From 
this stark fact emerged the beginning of the end for the GLF. Soviet advisors in China 
correctly reported to Moscow that Mao’s program of modernization would bring with it 
an incredible toll in human life.151 Westad writes that warnings from the Soviet advisors 
to their Chinese counterparts about the dangers of this program made their way to Mao, 
and it enraged him. Mao’s deep-seated sense of the Soviet’s treatment of the Chinese as 
inferior was bubbling over. Westad also describes how Mao’s relationship with 
Khrushchev also devolved. When Khrushchev visited Chairman Mao in attempts to 
conciliate him, Mao made a point to list all of the Soviet grievances against China since 
the 1920s. In another meeting, Mao infamously met Khrushchev in a pool knowing full 
well the Soviet leader could not swim.152 These were blatant efforts by Mao to 
destabilize the PRC’s alliance with the Soviets and extricate China from any Soviet 
influence. Mao’s tactics were working. 
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After the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis ended, Mao was certain that his domestic 
undertakings were not well-matched with the original form of the PRC’s alliance with the 
Soviets.153 On Khrushchev’s final visit to Beijing in 1959 Mao and his Foreign Minister, 
Chen Yi, verbally attacked Khrushchev calling him a “time server” to his face and 
accusing him of submitting to the American’s, supporting India over China, and refusing 
to share nuclear  secrets.154 This marked the official beginning of the Sino-Soviet split 
that eventually culminated in 1962. Mao subsequently began his preparations for a bold 
and public attack on Soviet foreign affairs and communist doctrine. Headed by Deng 
Xiaoping, a small group of CCP ideologues published a succession of articles on the 
ninetieth anniversary of Lenin’s birth that criticized the Soviets as “modern revisionists” 
that had “temporarily hoodwinked” the masses and called Marxist-Leninists around the 
world to “further arouse the revolutionary will of the masses.”155 In June of 1960 the two 
Communist heavyweights publicly clashed at the Romanian Communist Party’s congress 
and by July Khrushchev had ordered the withdrawal of the bulk of the 1,400 Soviet 
advisors in China.156 In two years Mao had brought the disaster of the GLF upon China 
and brought the country to the breaking point with all of its international partners. 
The GLF ended in 1961, and by that time certain key leaders within the CCP were 
taking stock of the situation in which the GLF had placed China.157 Westad describes a 
program that was designed to benefit the Chinese people and the country as a whole did 
the exact opposite, and that was keenly noted by leaders such as Deng Xiaoping, Liu 
Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai. Westad further illustrates that these three leaders were central in 
trying to clean up the disarray which Mao had caused through the GLF. Mao allowed his 
three top officials to use a brief respite in the spat with the Soviets in order to again use 
Soviet aid in China. Evidenced by Mao’s continued dominance of the party after such a 
disaster as the GLF, his leadership was becoming unquestionable. This became apparent 
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when in 1962 Liu Shaoqi and Wan Jiaxiang publicly criticized the GLF and called for a 
return to a Sino-Soviet alliance.158 Mao’s old ally and general, Peng Dehuai, also 
expressed concern over the GLF.159 Mao’s response to this challenge to his authority and 
vision helped define his command of the party for the rest of his reign and served as a 
critical moment in CCP history. Incensed, Mao fired back at his perceived opponents 
labeling them Chinese revisionists and declaring that class struggle continued under 
socialism.160 Mao’s response meant that anyone who challenged his ideas ran the risk of 
being labeled a revisionist and being purged from the party, or worse.161 CCP leaders 
were successfully browbeaten into submission, and Mao tightened his grip on the party. 
Given Mao’s power within the CCP and his cult personality, the fear within the party 
must have been palpable. These events were a foreshadowing of what was to happen 
during the GPCR, itself only four short years away. With Mao’s successful block of any 
thawing in the relationship with the Soviets and his dominance within the party 
unchallengeable, he was now free to rule a China that was the most internationally 
isolated, perhaps, it had ever been in its long past. The stage was now set for the onset of 
the GPCR. 
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VI. 1966–1976: THE GREAT PROLETARIAT CULTURAL 
REVOLUTION 
Communist ideology continued to play a prominent role in Chinese politics 
during the late 1960s and 70s. Truly a lost decade this ten year period achieved incredible 
destruction inside China and is considered a colossal failure.162 The highpoints of the 
GPCR lasted three years, from 1966 to 1969, but scholars point out that it continued in 
some form until 1976.163 Significant to this period is China’s turn inward from the 
diplomatic world; in 1967, all but one of China’s ambassadors overseas were recalled, 
resulting in the almost total cessation of regular foreign diplomacy.164 Its effect on 
foreign affairs was devastating; China was at loggerheads with almost all communist and 
non-communist governments worldwide.165 Relations with Soviet Russia also worsened 
when in March 1969 Chinese and Soviet armed forces clashed over disputed territory in 
the Ussuri River.166 Not only was China not interested in basic diplomacy, but any type 
of alliance formation, either bilateral or multilateral, was also out of the question. While 
the reasons for the GPCR are complex and require several lines of analysis, it is evident 
that Mao was the driving force.167 Any path to modernization was delayed until his 
passing. 
A. THE THIRD WORLD: NORTH KOREA AND NORTH VIETNAM 
Mao’s manufactured isolation of China in preparation for his revolution and 
expulsions did not stop his courting of the Third World and Westad chronicles these 
efforts well.168 During the intervening years between the GLF and the GPCR, the PRC 
sought to become the object upon which all other Third World countries gravitated to. 
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The message being sent from Beijing portrayed China as the bastion of agrarian 
revolutionary theory and all things Marxist-Leninist. And Mao was, of course, the 
virtuoso responsible for it all. Under this backdrop Beijing’s relationship with North 
Korea and North Vietnam became strained. As the conflict between the United States and 
North Vietnam heated up, North Korea wanted to seize the opportunity to advance its 
cause against the south but instead found itself in an ideological struggle with China. By 
1966 China and North Korea were exchanging very public verbal onslaughts at each 
other. North Vietnam also moved away from a China it saw as trying to mold Vietnam 
into a Chinese puppet. Mao’s split with the Soviets created an awkward triangular 
relationship between Vietnam, China, and the Soviet Union. In desperate need of Soviet 
assistance in the war with America, Vietnamese leaders were soured by China’s constant 
attempts to impeded Soviet aid to Vietnam. As the GPCR deepened in China, the 
ideological fervor that was created also alienated Vietnam. A once close ally was now at 
odds with China. In every Third World country China projected its interests in it was met 
with closed doors and a general repugnance. China’s one last foreign policy strategy of 
leading the Third World against Western imperialism was a failed enterprise.169 
B. CLASS STRUGGLE AND THE END OF THE GREAT PROLETARIAT 
REVOLUTION 
The reasoning for Mao’s push for the GPCR, and all of his revolutionary aims, 
was his ideological belief that only through class struggle and the maintenance of 
revolutionary zeal could any group of people attain a communist utopia.170 The origins of 
the GPCR are a mixture of a large number of various desires among differing groups. 
Though complex, Mao’s views were central to what took place during the GPCR, and he 
provided the impetus for its beginning.171 A central tenet of the GPCR was its 
xenophobia.172 As previously discussed, prominent in Mao’s thinking was the evils of the 
international system and what its influences could do in China. Not only did China’s 
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foreign policy become essentially nonexistent, but anything foreign, particularly Western, 
was targeted by the GPCR’s henchmen.173 People all over China who had any Western 
connections were publicly humiliated, and as the GPCR continued, often treated with 
extreme violence.174 Estimates put the number of victims of the GPCR between 400,000 
and 700,000.175 Based upon Mao’s doctrine of revolution and the assumption that 
conspiratorial intellectuals were weakening the party, the educated were usually the ones 
targeted.176 Those carrying out the purging were primarily young and disgruntled 
Chinese whom Mao had empowered to carry out the social revolution he thought was 
needed.177 Repressed and angry at what they thought was a corrupt bureaucracy they 
lashed out with a vengeance.178 While most of the party members were never safe during 
the height of the GPCR, Mao himself retained his lofty position. Mao used his position 
and the general unrest well. He believed that the youth must be the ones to experience the 
revolution themselves in order to rid China and the CCP itself of any revisionists.179 It 
also served China to have its young people filled with the revolutionary zeal needed to 
continue to drive to communism.180 The international isolation Mao orchestrated had 
created, in his mind, the conditions needed to save China and continue the revolution.181  
By late 1967, Mao’s created disorder grew to a proportion that made even him 
nervous.182 Despite Mao’s ideology that the masses needed to be involved in revolution 
and not ruled from on high by the cultured elite, a complete lack of control soon lead to a 
state of anarchy that even Mao decided was too radical.183 The country needed to 
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function, and the party needed to exercise some type of control over the Red Guards 
before the chaos spun outside the party’s control. However, social disorder at the levels 
reached during the GPCR is quite difficult to arrest.184 It took until the summer of 1968 
before something resembling order was reestablished.185 Furthermore, the turmoil 
created by the GPCR also predisposed the leadership of the CCP to fear a war with the 
Soviets, another main determinate in seeking a slowdown to the GPCR.186 Westad 
indicates that despite no real evidence, party cadre nonetheless felt they were a target. 
Buying into the frenzied ideology of the GPCR, party logic assumed that their position 
was one to be coveted by the Soviets and that they sought China’s destruction. Ever 
seeking to stay ahead of the perceived Soviet threat, Mao agreed to an unprovoked attack 
against the Soviets along the Ussuri River in 1969. Despite some rather intense border 
fighting, real war was avoided. By the early 1970s Mao began to consider the idea that 
such international isolation as had been achieved in China was becoming dangerous.187 
The real threat of war in 1969 and the level of chaos achieved by his engineered social 
revolution combined to convince the charismatic leader that China needed a course 
correction.  
Ironically, Mao began seeking advice from the very people he had allowed to be 
purged during the intense periods of the GPCR.188 Westad writes that because of Mao’s 
desire to rid China of the chaos from his own creation, he sought out former army chiefs 
and queried them on what they thought was a good way forward for China 
internationally. Not surprisingly, they utilized Mao’s own teaching on the exploitation of 
contradictions to suggest playing the Americans off the Soviets to benefit China. While 
still publicly condemning these men, Mao nevertheless acted upon their suggestion that 
he seek a rapprochement of sorts with the United States.189 Mao’s decision to pursue 
relations with the Americans came at a very opportune time. China was left critically 
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vulnerable due to Mao’s programs, and the top leaders that were able to survive the 
purges knew it was important for China to break out of its political isolation. Enter 
President Richard Nixon, a tried and true American Cold Warrior who also believed 
America needed allies outside of Europe and Japan to succeed against the Soviets.190 
Westad records that this was not a popular nor was it a politically viable position in 
American politics in the early 1970s, yet Nixon was willing to attempt a major political 
gamble when he sought out China. While the vestiges of the GPCR lasted until Mao’s 
death, a warming of the relationship with America occurred in 1972 when Nixon was 
finally to pay an official visit to China.191 The GPCR was coming to an end, and with 
Mao’s death in 1976, China entered a new era from which China slowly emerged from 
isolation and sought greater engagement with the international community. Despite this, 
the PRC’s foreign policy continued to be suspicious of the West’s alliance structure and 
primarily bilateral in nature. 
China’s gradual move toward isolation started in the 1950s and culminated with 
near total isolation by 1966. Mao’s control of the party and his intense distrust of the 
West and even the Soviets was combined with his revolutionary communist ideology and 
created a scenario in which China not only eschewed multilateralism, but any formal 
alliances whatsoever. The PRC’s relationships with every foreign state it had were 
destroyed during the 1960s. China’s ascent to modernity was not a foregone conclusion 
in 1976. The PRC could easily have continued its leftward descent or it could attempt 
some reform and opening of the country. 
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VII. 1977–1989: CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY AFTER MAO AND 
EFFORTS TO MODERNIZE 
After Mao’s death, there was a significant internal struggle for power which 
culminated in the arrest and trial of the Gang of Four, revolutionary Maoists, and the rise 
of Deng Xiaoping in 1978.192 This period marked a distinct difference in both China’s 
internal and external policies. Chinese leadership turned to favor a foreign policy that was 
more apt to accept the international situation as it was and avoid Mao’s disruptive 
revolutionary approach.193 With Mao’s death, the remnants of GPCR leftism were almost 
entirely eradicated.194 In its wake, China’s leaders embraced a more realistic approach to 
foreign policy, but they still retained their rejection of imperialist hegemony and their 
desire to pursue an “independent foreign policy.”195 Firmly independent, China’s leaders 
viewed alliances with either of the superpowers as impediments to China’s strategic 
options and its ability to accomplish stated goals.196 Referencing Zhou Enlai’s Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and its requirement of only normal bilateral relations, 
Chinese foreign policy makers rejected trilateral, and by association multilateral, 
alliances because they limited China’s options.197 According to Ronald Keith, “the 
current strategic emphasis on bilateralism as opposed to trilateralism and on ‘opposition 
to hegemony’ must in part be explained by reference to the ideological connotations of 
‘independent foreign policy.’”198 China’s strong stance against hegemonism, or 
imperialism, has been rooted in both a historic cultural aversion and a more pragmatic 
realist calculation of self-interest.199 Either way, during the late 1970s and mid-1980s, 
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Chinese foreign policy continued to steer clear of multilateral alliances in its foreign 
affairs due to its historical roots on foreign policy and a desire for flexibility. 
How could China become a successful modern country? That was a question 
asked by many Chinese leaders living in a post-Mao China. The isolation that Mao had 
thrust China into created a skeptical generation and a nation-state that was one of the 
poorest in the world. The CCP program was supposed to make China powerful and 
economically successful, but it had done the exact opposite. By 1978, Deng Xiaoping had 
gained significant influence within the CCP, and he used that influence to move China 
closer to the Americans.200 Deng’s 1979 visit to America was a watershed moment for 
him.201 Westad writes of Deng seeing the high levels of productivity, technologies, and 
standard of living, and he recognized America’s preeminent position in the world and 
thought it insanity to avoid a rapprochement with them. Modernization was the primary 
goal for Deng, and in order to accomplish that he needed technology transfers for both 
the military and civilian spheres. A central element in the Sino-American warming during 
the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s was the focus on opposition toward all things 
Soviet. Once China’s principal ally, the Soviet Union was now the instrument used by 
China to gain American aid.202 Ironically, Mao’s orchestrated Sino-Soviet split of 1963 
was being used to create an alliance of sorts with America in order to generate the 
economic growth that seemed so elusive during the short 30 year history of the CCP. 
The political relationship with the United States was not without its difficulties, 
however. Taiwan continued to be a burr in the boot of the PRC. During the 1977 
Eleventh Party Congress, then Party Chairman Hua Guofeng outlined the conditions of 
China’s bilateral relations with the United States: an annulment of the 1954 mutual 
defense treaty between the United States and Taiwan, removal of American troops from 
Taiwan, and a cessation of official diplomatic relations with Taipei.203 Noteworthy about 
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the PRC’s foreign policy is the continued adherence to bilateral only relations. Sutter 
notes that the 1972 Shanghai communique with America did not include any other 
nations, and China’s anti-hegemony strategy against the Soviets did not include any other 
Asian states. When Deng consolidated power in 1978, he did little to adjust China’s 
elementary foreign affairs strategy, instead concentrating on practical ways to modernize 
China both economically and politically. Sutter notes this new found focus under Deng, 
however, reinforced the need to exercise effective diplomacy with the Americans in order 
to modernize and counterbalance the pressure China was receiving from the Soviets. The 
relatively weak state of China muted much of the CCP’s nationalistic goals such as 
Taiwan. While Deng’s leadership continued to hold onto claims to Taiwan and the strong 
desire to lead the Third World there was little that could be done about them. Deng 
recognized China’s foreign policy needed to continue the development of the rift between 
the two superpowers so China could continue its own growth.204 And the main way 
China did that under Deng was through bilateral means. 
  The early 1980s saw tensions develop between America’s new leadership under 
Reagan and the PRC over Reagan’s two China policy. However, Chinese foreign policy 
in the last decade under the Cold War continued to be dominated by the need to maintain 
good relations with the United States in order to maintain a balance of power and an 
opposition to hegemony.205 While China continued to seek American aid, it neither 
entered into anything like a formal alliance with the United States nor declared that it was 
either for the Soviets or the United States, only against hegemony.206 An inherent 
tension, however, is observable between China’s adherence to the ideology of the Five 
Principles and China’s very pragmatic approach to foreign affairs.207 This divergence in 
Chinese foreign policy was ever present in the 1980s, and continues today, and required a 
delicate balancing act from CCP leadership. China’s commitment to its foreign policy 
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ideals was and is very real and helps account for their adherence to a bilateral foreign 
policy strategy. In 1984 Chinese premier, Wu Xueqian, made a public statement 
describing China’s relations with the Soviets and the Americans as two separate entities 
that could not be made concomitant.208 Hu Yaobang, as General Secretary of the 
Communist Party, also publicly stated in 1985 that the PRC would not enter into any 
formal alliance with either superpower.209 To do so limited China’s attempts to gain 
friendships with other countries (a violation of the Five Principles), and it prevented 
China from keeping the moral high ground.210 In other words, China was less able to 
counter another states injustice and it provided opportunities for other countries to attack 
the friends of China. However, China was very committed to modernizing and knew that 
in order to do that it needed a certain level of strategic partnership with the United States. 
China did not massively open up its market and adopt more capitalist principles 
until the 1990s, but the gradual modernization campaign under Deng in the 1980s set the 
stage for China’s massive economic growth over the following twenty years.211 As more 
new ideas began filtering into China and the beginnings of economic prosperity began to 
take root, the CCP and China soon embarked on a period marked by turbulent protests 
that challenged the established order and forced the CCP to reestablish its legitimacy in 
the eyes of the populace.212 With the arrival of Kentucky Fried Chicken, Coca-Cola, 
Heinz, and other American companies in China all things American became en vogue.213 
This included Western style democracy and the desire for more personal representation 
among its citizens. That exploded onto the scene in the form of the Tiananmen Square 
massacre and an eventual bargain between the CCP and the Chinese people which 
allowed for central political control to remain with the CCP and also provide a good life 
for the people. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
This final chapter of the thesis reflects on the main findings, explores options for 
future research, and finally identifies the implications of the research. By doing so it 
identifies and acknowledges the inherent difficulties in analyzing such a complex and 
deep history such as Chinese foreign policy. The previous chapters indicate that CCP 
bilateralism has many varied reasons but that Mao Zedong is a central focal point in 
understanding why Chinese communist foreign policy has been primarily bilateral. This 
thesis also concludes that the PRC has not been well served by its adherence to bilateral 
alliance policies and as a result experienced broad economic stagnation which produced 
extensive amounts of death and suffering for the Chinese people. Despite the hail of 
criticism after the Tiananmen Square incident, China emerged as the most dominant East 
Asian power in the 1990s, perhaps even legitimately being capable of challenging 
American influence in the region. Claude A. Buss describes the more modern China as 
such: “History and geography have combined to make China the dominant state in East 
Asia… [and] an important factor in shaping the future of that part of the world.”214 As 
the global political structure continues to change and U.S. preeminence is continually 
challenged, the PRC will almost certainly be an important player in some form or 
fashion.  
A. MAIN FINDINGS 
The history of Chinese foreign relations is complicated and full of various 
influences. This thesis has sought to provide some of the reasons for China’s preference 
for bilateral vice multilateral alliances by looking at the CCP’s foreign policy history and 
attempting to analyze their behavior and policies. This thesis has examined multiple 
factors that have contributed to CCP bilateralism over the majority of its existence. The 
one hundred years of national humiliation had a formative impact on the worldviews of 
Mao and other prominent CCP leaders. Given the humiliation narrative’s critical role in 
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shaping the CCP in its early years and the newly formed PRC after 1949, it is essential to 
begin with late Qing period in Chinese history to begin understanding why the CCP 
chose bilateralism in an increasingly multilateral world. Central to understanding the 
formative years of the CCP is the ineffaceable presence of the humiliation of China at the 
hands of Western powers and Japan. The demise of imperial China in 1911 scarred many 
Chinese and sent them searching for ways to regain China’s lost status. As a result, the 
early 20th century was filled with struggle and competing ideologies vying for 
preeminence within China. Out of this fray an unlikely contender, the CCP, ended up 
with political control in China. Laced throughout the party was a natural distrust for the 
West and its alliance systems. Determined to establish Chinese sovereignty Mao, and 
others, sought to redefine the nature of international politics and establish China as a 
major player. The lessons learned from the previous century of Western domination 
taught Mao and the CCP to be cautious, but it also taught them of the need for China to 
establish and maintain its own independence. Described as standing up by Mao, China’s 
ability to act independently and keep free from foreign domination loomed large in CCP 
foreign policy thought for over thirty years. 
China’s ruling party, the CCP, was largely dominated by Mao Zedong and his 
views. This dominance gave Mao the distinct ability to direct China’s course along his 
chosen path. Distrust of multilateralism as a tool of Western hegemony and the 
acceptance of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence lent themselves as tools from 
which to keep China out of a Western style system of alliances. Additionally, it also 
helped China distinguish itself from its closest ally, the Soviet Union. Any understanding 
of CCP foreign policy in the ‘50s and ‘60s must consider the depth and breadth of Soviet 
aid to the PRC. While deeply distrustful of foreign aid and meddling within China, Mao 
and other key leaders within China had to accept foreign aid as a means to return China 
to greatness. While deep and vital, relying on Soviet aid was never seen as something that 
benefited China long term. Additionally, with European colonialism quickly fading 
China’s revolutionary success was thought, by the CCP, to be the model for emerging 
revolutionary movements. While the CCP sought to aid and influence these movements it 
was often from a distance and unquestionably without entangling itself through alliances 
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and commitments. China under Mao had its own revolutionary path to follow and could 
not be encumbered by the needs and desires of others. Mao’s engineered isolation 
program inhibited China from ever contending in the global community of nations and 
accepting multilateralism. As China entered the 1960s it’s turning away from the 
international community deepened and China eventually became, perhaps, the most 
isolated and impoverished of all countries.  
 Deeply indebted to the Soviets for the amount of aid provided to China, Mao 
nonetheless increasingly saw the Soviets as a hindrance to China’s progress. By the close 
of the 1950s the Sino-Soviet relationship was in tatters, and Mao continued to direct 
China along his own unique path. After China’s split with the Soviets, intense isolation 
characterized CCP foreign policy during the 1960s and early 1970s. Mao’s ideological 
commitment to continuous social revolution as the answer to China’s problems was 
steadfast as Beijing split from Moscow. From Beijing’s perspective, Moscow was at odds 
with the goals laid out by Chairman Mao. As Mao pursued his social goals designed to 
modernize and invigorate China, the country slipped further into isolation. Instead of 
surpassing the West and providing the model of success for the Third World, China’s 
economy stagnated and untold millions of Chinese perished during Mao’s Great Leap 
Forward. This continued with the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution, which produced 
fewer deaths but decimated China’s most valuable human assets through arrests and 
imprisonment. By the mid-1970s China was an impoverished and near destitute country 
on the international stage.  
Only recently has the PRC participated in multilateral institutions. This process 
could be seen to begin in the 1980s, as Deng Xiaoping began economic modernization 
along Western methodology. However, China continued to prefer bilateral relationships 
and reject alliances with the superpowers on the basis that they inhibited China’s growth. 
While communist ideological fervor was greatly lessened, CCP leaders were still greatly 
influenced by their past. Top CCP leaders continued to reject hegemony as an 
imperialistic tool while at the same time embracing new economic liberalization. Zhou 
Enlai’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence maintained a prominent role in CCP 
politics with regard to alliance politics. CCP leaders continued to reject participation in 
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multilateral alliances as the means to play the Americans and the Soviets off one another 
to benefit China. Nowhere in China’s calculus during the 1980s was there a desire to 
embrace multilateralism. 
As China opened up its markets and sought more economic modernization, other 
Western ideas crept in as well. China’s age old fascination with the West manifested 
itself with the arrival of American fast food chains and the desire for a more democratic 
style of government. The CCP’s brutal suppression of the democratic upsurge within 
China was most prominently displayed in the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989. Far 
from embracing the West’s representative style of government, the CCP fought to keep 
an iron grip on absolute leadership of China. Some of the main grievances voiced by the 
protestors were dreams not unlike their forbearers from years past, dreams of a better life 
with improved living conditions and the sense that the government would not or could 
not provide that.215 The key component then, for the CCP, was to make a tradeoff; in 
order to maintain political control a certain level of economic success was needed to 
provide the promise of a good life that allowed for continued party dominance of China’s 
politics.216 A tenuous balance was struck.  
The recent emergence of multilateralism in Chinese politics is worth a cursory 
overview in conclusion of this thesis. Elements of an adherence to bilateralism in the 
more modern era is evident in a 2006 study from the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences that identifies Chinese leadership as exercising restraint in global politics to 
avoid excess international obligations that could restrict  China’s growth.217 That type of 
restraint indicates a country that is not willing to laden itself down with the obligations 
that multilateral alliances bring with it. However, there is a growing body of evidence 
that indicates China has embraced multilateralism in order to promote and guard its own 
national interests. 
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Wu Xinbo argues that while China has shown a willingness to entertain 
multilateral negotiations, bilateral relations still primarily define its foreign policy. As a 
recent ascendant to the heights of international power, China continues to prefer bilateral 
relations for two primary reasons: China lacks experience in multilateralism, and it 
historically harbors strong suspicions toward global apparatuses that tend to favor the 
interests of the Great Powers. While China is exploring multilateralism on the economic 
front and is aware of its expectations to play a greater role in international affairs as a 
dominant power, China continues to find certain multilateral scenarios threatening. 
Because of this, China has consistently been pursuing bilateral agreements. In the South 
China Sea, China fears a united Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with 
U.S. support creating a wall of resistance against China’s territorial claims in any type of 
multilateral negotiations, hence China has consistently insisted upon approaching the 
issue in a bilateral fashion. Another example of this was the effort to develop a trilateral 
dialogue between China, the United States, and Japan. China showed little interest in 
such a scenario because of suspicion of the United States-Japanese relationship and the 
threat it posed in forcing China’s hand in negotiations. As China’s power and relevance 
in the international arena increase, its preference for bilateral negotiations will likely 
undergo some type of adjustment to accommodate increased responsibility. In his work, 
Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War, Robert Sutter also 
agrees with Wu’s framework of why China has traditionally eschewed multilateralism. 
However, he goes on to provide strong examples of multilateral activity from China since 
the end of the Cold War.218 
Since the 1990s, China has shown an increase in multilateralism, primarily in 
economic areas and somewhat in security areas.219 China has backed the U.N. and its 
Security Council as legitimate in providing an international forum for security concerns, 
deepened its ties with the ASEAN to include a China-ASEAN free trade agreement 
(FTA), joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), and furthered multilateral 
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collaboration with the six-member Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).220 This, 
however, has not shown a complete adoption of multilateralism. China continues to guard 
narrow self-interests on Chinese sovereignty issues and is predominantly suspicious of 
U.S.-led ventures that China suspects as designed to limit its interests or power.221 
Additionally, China has shown a great reluctance to join the global community on other 
issues such as “human rights, environmental, energy, and international security questions, 
including arms control.”222 Examples of this type of resistance to multilateralism include 
the following: Chinese opposition to U.N. led efforts to increase human rights and 
democracy throughout the world, a reticence to partner with developed states to manage 
the world’s energy market, a repudiation of any international environmental standards 
that are seen to inhibit Chinese growth, an unwillingness to join in the United States led 
discussions on Asian security issues at the Shangri-La Forum, persistent efforts at 
weapons advancement in the face of international reproach, and finally continued efforts 
to leverage Asian organizations against U.S. presence along China’s borders in Asia.223  
A continued distrust of the global system, as it exists today, still seems at work 
inside the PRC. What this means for U.S. international interests are of the utmost 
importance. While China has appeared to embrace multilateralism and join the 
international community of nation-states, it has done so cautiously and calculatedly. 
Always keeping an eye on its own interests, the PRC has so far managed to join and/or 
participate in multilateral institutions such as the UN, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), World Bank, and ASEAN while at the same time maintaining its own narrow 
nationalistic goals that are often criticized by the same multilateral institutions. 
B. OPTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Given the limited scope of a master’s thesis there is ample room to further explore 
the history of bilateralism in CCP foreign policy. Additionally, given the secretive and 
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closed nature of CCP politics, scholars do not currently have access to all of the CCP 
documents and official party records often available in more open societies. If the PRC 
continues to effect liberalizations in its governing of China, new opportunities for 
scholarly research on CCP foreign policy will likely, and hopefully, become available. 
When these opportunities present themselves, China watchers from around the globe will 
have the opportunity to further advance the study of the ancient and dynamic culture we 
know as China.  
C. IMPLICATIONS  
This thesis has studied the nature and history of the CCP’s bilateral foreign policy 
development and has several implications for U.S. policy. As Sino-U.S. dialogue 
continues to progress, the CCP will likely continue as the dominant political force within 
China in some form or fashion; as such, their historic preference for avoiding foreign 
alliances and shying away from burdensome commitments will likely continue to shape 
CCP foreign policy. While the future is unknowable, it is certain that China will be a 
pivotal player in the future of global politics, but how that will manifest itself is 
unknown. Westad directs our attention to the fact “that those who expect China to remain 
for a long time as it is today will be proven wrong. Its turbulent past points toward a 
changeable future, during which both locals and foreigners will be surprised at the 
continuous resourcefulness and adaptability of the Chinese people.”224 Though the PRC 
has recently embraced multilateral institutions it has done so with its own interests in 
mind and has skillfully avoided adopting many of the West’s democratic ideals. Those 
ideals: human rights, representative government, individual liberty, and government 
transparency, to name a few, will likely continue to act as sources of friction between 
China’s interests and the West’s. American policy makers should not lose sight of 
China’s tumultuous past and its historic tendencies with respect to foreign affairs. The 
future well-being of Sino-U.S. relations will depend on that.  
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